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INTRODUCTION
Back when there was a Soviet Union, foreign intelligence officers would
anxiously await the May Day parade in Moscow to see who would be standing
next to the chairman of the Communist Party and who would be missing from the
reviewing platform altogether. Since the Soviet government and the state-
controlled press published very little about what was really going on in the halls of
state power, this was considered the most reliable way to determine who was in or
out of favor and, by extension, how the domestic and foreign policies of the
world's second most powerful country were likely to change in the near term.
Readers will, I hope, forgive me when I say that I feel a bit like those
erstwhile Kremlinologists whenever I await a decision from the Supreme Court
involving the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Ever since the Court's 2006
decision in Hudson v. Michigan,' which I managed to lose by a 5-4 vote as Booker
T. Hudson's attorney, it has been clear that there are four votes on the Court to
overrule Mapp v. Ohio2 and thereby abolish the exclusionary sanction for Fourth
Amendment violations. In Hudson, the majority held that the exclusionary rule
would not apply to knock-and-announce violations at all and, in so holding,
broadly suggested that the exclusionary rule itself was unjustifiable and outdated.
The only thing apparently standing between Mapp and an outright abrogation of
the exclusionary rule was Justice Kennedy, who signed the majority opinion in
Hudson but then issued a cryptic concurrence seemingly repudiating the very same
vehemently anti-exclusionary language in the majority opinion that he had joined.
For three years after Hudson, the Court seemed determined to stay away from
Fourth Amendment cases altogether. Perhaps this is because neither the majority
justices nor the dissenters in Hudson knew where Justice Kennedy really stood as
to the continuing vitality of the exclusionary rule.4
Clinical Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan. I
am indebted to my colleagues at the law school for their comments on an oral presentation on the
Davis case I made at a faculty colloquium on July 20, 2011.
I Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See id; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 602-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he continued operation
of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.").
4 I wrote two articles in the immediate aftermath of Hudson in which I tried to make sense of
Justice Kennedy's concurrence and what it meant for the future of the exclusionary rule. David A.
Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the
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Finally, in 2009, the Court took a case, Herring v. United States,5 that gave
the Court an opportunity to expand on Hudson. The nominal issue in Herring was
whether evidence should be excluded when a police officer reasonably relied on an
erroneous arrest warrant in a police database to justify an arrest and resulting
search.6 In the resulting 5-4 decision concluding that such evidence should not be
suppressed, clues emerged as to the internal struggle that must have been going on
between Justice Kennedy and the others in the majority. Unlike Justice Scalia's
anti-exclusionary jeremiad in Hudson, there is no language in Herring directly
suggesting that Mapp should be overruled. Instead, the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts contained a different, more subtle attack on the exclusionary rule,
by suggesting that exclusion may be available only to punish "deliberate, reckless,
or grossly negligent" violations of the Fourth Amendment.' When the police
violate the Fourth Amendment negligently (as opposed to "grossly negligently"),
the Herring majority suggested, the violation lacks sufficient culpability to justify
the heavy sanction of exclusion.
I use the word "suggested" in the preceding paragraph instead of "held"
because the distinction the Herring majority drew between various culpable mental
states that police officers might have while violating the Fourth Amendment is
entirely unnecessary to the result. Since, according to the majority, the police
acted reasonably in relying on a database of warrants that was well-maintained and
relatively error-free,9 the case seemed to provide no occasion for the Court to
Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 283 (2006); David A. Moran, Waiting for the Other
Shoe: Hudson and the Precarious State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1725 (2008).
s Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
6 Id. at 138. The Court had earlier held in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. I (1995), that evidence
need not be excluded when police reasonably rely on an arrest warrant found in a database because a
court clerk had failed to delete it. Evans was thus an extension of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984), in which the Court held that evidence should not be excluded when the police reasonably
rely on a search warrant erroneously issued by a magistrate because the exclusionary rule is designed
to deter mistakes committed by the police, not by other actors in the system. The salient difference
between Herring and Evans, then, is that it was a police agent who committed the error in Herring by
failing to accurately maintain the arrest warrant database while it was a court clerk who committed
the same error in Evans.
See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 ("To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or systemic negligence.").
See id. at 147-48 ("In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression
must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, we conclude that when police
mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its way."'
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6 (1984)).
9 As Chief Justice Roberts explained for the majority:
[T]here is no evidence that errors in Dale County's system are routine or widespread.
Officer Anderson testified that he had never had reason to question information about a
Dale County warrant, and both Sandy Pope and Sharon Morgan testified that they could
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distinguish between officers who are merely negligent and officers acting with
more culpable mental states. On the contrary, the majority concluded that the
police in Herring were not negligent at all.
To put it simply, the language in Herring limiting the exclusionary rule to
violations committed by grossly negligent (or worse) police officers looks like
dicta. The four justices in dissent in Herring were careful not to refer to the
culpability language in the majority opinion as a holding.' 0 But would the majority
view it as established law in a future case?"
It was with great interest and anxiety, therefore, that I awaited the Court's
decision this summer in Davis v. United States,12 the second case since Hudson in
which the exclusionary rule may have been in play. In Davis, the nominal issue
was whether evidence should be excluded when the binding precedent the officers
relied upon to perform a search was overruled after the search was performed.' 3
Given the Court's longstanding precedent holding that the sole purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter the police from committing Fourth Amendment
violations, the outcome in Davis was entirely predictable: the police won. Still, the
case did present some interesting and knotty problems as to how to square the
result with the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence.
But more interesting than the result to me were two aspects of the majority
opinion that tell us more about where the Court really stands on the exclusionary
rule. First, the tone of Justice Alito's majority opinion in Davis was almost, but
not quite, as critical of Mapp and the exclusionary rule as Justice Scalia's opinion
in Hudson. Second, Justice Alito tried his best to elevate the Herring dicta to
established precedent even though that dicta has no arguable application at all to
the facts in Davis.
In this term paper, therefore, I will do two things. First, I will discuss the
facts and holding of Davis and explain why I concur with the outcome even though
I agree with almost nothing else in Justice Alito's majority opinion. Second, I will
use the clues sprinkled in that opinion to gauge (or guess?) where the Court really
stands on the future of the exclusionary rule.
remember no similar miscommunication ever happening on their watch. That is even less
error than in the database at issue in where we also found reliance on the database to be
objectively reasonable.
Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
1o See id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule, the Court suggests, is
capable of only marginal deterrence when the misconduct at issue is merely careless, not intentional
or reckless.") (emphasis added). As I shall discuss infra, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg now explicitly
view the culpability language in Herring as dicta.
1 Professor LaFave, for one, views the culpability language in Herring not as dicta but as a
holding that threatens the exclusionary rule itself. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).
12 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
'3 See id. at 2423 (framing question presented as "whether to apply [the exclusionary rule]
when police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled").
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I. DAVIS: THE EASY CASE ON THE SURFACE
A casual reader perusing Justice Alito's majority opinion in Davis would
likely conclude that this case was a slam dunk for the government. That casual
reader would be correct.
To fully understand the legal issues in Davis and why the result was entirely
predictable, it is necessary to briefly review three lines of the Court's precedent:
(1) the Fourth Amendment cases involving searches of automobiles following
arrests of occupants of those vehicles; (2) the Court's many pronouncements as to
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule; and (3) the cases in
which the Court has explained if and when a judicial decision establishing a new
rule of criminal procedure becomes applicable to police activity that occurred
before the decision issued.
A. Belton to Gant: Arrestees and the Stuff They Leave Behind in Cars
The first thing that had to happen before the issue in Davis could arise was for
the Supreme Court to effectively overrule one of its Fourth Amendment decisions
in such a way as to cut back on police authority to perform searches and seizures.
This sort of event happens very rarely indeed-more about that below-but it did
happen in 2009 in Arizona v. Gant.14
In Gant, the Court dealt with the question of under what circumstances the
police may search the passenger compartment of an automobile after arresting one
or more of the occupants of that vehicle. The Court had seemingly answered that
question authoritatively twenty-eight years earlier in New York v. Belton. 5 In
Belton, an officer stopped a car on the New York State Thruway and arrested the
four occupants. The officer then searched the passenger compartment and found
cocaine inside a jacket on the backseat.'6  The Court, after noting that it had
already promulgated a bright-line rule permitting automatic searches within the
reach (or "grabbing distance") of persons arrested inside dwellings,'7 issued what
sure appeared to be a bright-line rule for searches of persons arrested in vehicles:
"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile."
Belton thus issued an easily-understood, bright-line rule: when the police
arrest someone who has recently been in a car, the police can search the passenger
14 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332; 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
1s New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
16 Id. at 456.
17 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding police may search incident to
arrest in a dwelling "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items").
" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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compartment (but not the trunk) of that car. While the four arrestees in Belton
were standing, un-handcuffed, on the side of the Thruway while the officer
performed the search, '9 nothing in the holding apparently turned on that fact. The
majority opinion, it seemed, was based on the sensible proposition that someone in
a car who realizes that he or she is about to be arrested is likely to try to hide
contraband or weapons.
In the wake of Belton, virtually every appellate court in the United States
issued decisions confirming that Belton had created a simple, bright-line rule:
custodial arrest of someone in or recently in a car means that the police can
automatically search the passenger compartment. 20 I believe it is safe to say that
virtually every criminal procedure professor in every American law school taught
the same rule to generations of law students. I certainly did.
The first hint that Belton's bright-line rule might not be so bright after all
came twenty-three years later in Thornton v. United States.21  The issue in
Thornton was, nominally, whether the Belton automatic-search rule applied when
the arrestee was already out of the car but still next to the car when the officer
arrived on the scene.22 The majority concluded that the Belton rule did indeed
permit an automatic search in such circumstances.23 However, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, issued a concurring opinion that surprised many
(including me) by attacking the Belton bright-line rule. Justice Scalia argued that a
search of a vehicle incident to arrest is unreasonable unless the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle or the officer has reason to
believe that evidence relating to the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle.24
Justice O'Connor issued a brief concurrence indicating she was inclined to agree
with Justice Scalia's criticism of the Belton bright-line rule.25 Justices Stevens and
Souter dissented from the extension of Belton to the situation presented in
19 Id. at 467-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that under the majority's approach "the
result would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his
companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest").
20 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) ("For years, Belton was widely
understood to have set down a simple, bright-line rule. Numerous courts read the decision to
authorize automobile searches incident to arrests of recent occupants, regardless of whether the
arrestee in any particular case was within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search.").
21 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
22 Id. at 617.
23 Id. (holding that "Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the
person arrested has left the vehicle").
24 Id at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment
because he concluded that the officer, having arrested Thornton for a drug offense, would have
reason to believe that there would be drugs in the car.
25 Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor explained that she declined to
adopt Justice Scalia's approach because the parties had not briefed it. Id at 625.
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Thornton without stating whether or not they agreed with Justice Scalia's
approach.26
That meant that there might be as many as five votes to overrule or limit
Belton. All that was needed was a case to present the issue.
Gant was that case. Taking Justice Scalia's cue from Thornton, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the search of Gant's car was unreasonable because he was
handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the time of the search.27
The Court granted certiorari in Gant and affirmed by a 5-4 vote.28 In the
majority opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court adopted wholesale the framework
Justice Scalia had proposed in his Thornton concurrence: a search of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest is unreasonable if the arrestee is
secured and not within reach of the vehicle unless the officer has reason to believe
that evidence relating to the crime of arrest will be found inside the vehicle.29
Whether or not one agrees with the majority that the Belton bright-line rule
permitted too many unreasonable searches, Justice Stevens' majority opinion can
only be described as disingenuous in the lengths to which it went to avoid flatly
overruling Belton. According to Justice Stevens, the fact that Belton and his
fellow travelers were unsecured and standing on the side of the Thruway made all
the difference to the result in that case. 30 Never mind that Belton had stated a
bright-line rule that did not seem to depend on the fact that the arrestees were
unsecured or that courts since Belton had universally understood that the case
created an automatic-search rule. Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, Belton need
not be overruled; only that "broad reading" of Belton need be rejected." Justice
Scalia provided the fifth vote in Gant and joined Justice Stevens' opinion to make
it a majority, but issued a separate concurrence to make clear that he simply would
have overruled Belton (and Thornton as well).32
Although Gant did not formally overrule Belton, it surely marked a sea
change in how officers must conduct themselves during traffic stops. No longer
could officers automatically search a vehicle upon arresting someone who had
recently been inside that vehicle. Since standard police procedure calls for
immediately securing arrestees, Gant means, in most cases, that the police may
perform a search incident to a recent arrest of an occupant if and only if there is
reason to believe there is evidence of the crime of arrest there.
26 Id. at 633-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007).
28 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
29 Id. at 1719.
3o See id. at 1717 (pointing out that state's brief in Belton emphasized fact that arrestees were
close to vehicle at time of search and brief of United States as amicus curiae similarly stressed that
search occurred before arrest was "completed").
3 Id. at 1722.
32 See id. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. The Sole Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule: Deter the Police
The second line of authority in play in Davis is the set of cases holding that
the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from committing
Fourth Amendment violations. This line arguably goes back at least as far as
Mapp, which extended the exclusionary rule to state courts because the Court
found that other remedies were "worthless and futile" in encouraging the police to
comply with Fourth Amendment demands. Mapp, however, did not explicitly
state that police deterrence was the sole justification for the exclusionary rule.
The primary source of the line leading to Davis, however, is the Court's 1984
decision in United States v. Leon34 and its companion case, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard,5 in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule would not apply if
the police reasonably relied upon a warrant issued by a judicial officer even if it
turned out that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause (Leon) or contained
a fatal facial defect (Sheppard). After conducting a lengthy review of the history
and purposes of the exclusionary rule, the Court in Leon concluded that the sole
purpose of the rule is to deter police violations of the Fourth Amendinent and that,
therefore, police officers who reasonably rely upon the validity of warrants issued
by magistrates are not engaged in conduct that should be deterred. The Court
rejected the notion that magistrates need to be deterred because they are not
engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime and investigating
criminals.36
The Court has extended Leon several times. First, in Illinois v. Krull, 37 the
Court held that the exclusionary sanction does not apply to a warrantless search
conducted under a statute later held to be unconstitutional, so long as the statute
was not so flagrantly unconstitutional that a reasonable officer would not have
relied on it. The Court again reiterated that the sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter the police, not legislators who enact unconstitutional laws.3 8
Second, in Arizona v. Evans,9 the Court held that the deterrent purpose of Leon
would not be furthered by excluding evidence found as the result of an arrest that
turned out to be illegal because the clerk of the court had failed to cancel the arrest
warrant upon which the officer relied. The Evans Court once again repeated the
33 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961). I say the line arguably goes back "at least as far
as Mapp" because Mapp itself observed that "Only last year the Court itself recognized that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' Id. at 656 (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
34 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
3s Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
36 Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17.
3 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1987).
SId. at 349-52.
3 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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now-familiar mantra that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the
police, not other actors such as sloppy court clerks.40
So, the rule from the Leon line is fairly clear. Since the exclusionary rule is
solely intended to deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment, evidence
will not be excluded if state actors other than the police make mistakes leading to
Fourth Amendment violations so long as the police reasonably relied upon the
authority they apparently had to act.
C. The Retroactivity ofNew Rules of Criminal Procedure
Finally, I must say a very quick word about a third line of cases that came into
play in Davis, namely the precedent declaring when new rules apply retroactively
in criminal cases. In the 1960s, the Warren Court issued an impressive series of
decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure governing police
interrogations, eyewitness identification procedures, and, of course, search and
seizure. Naturally, each of these decisions raised the question as to whether the
new rule would require relief to those who had already been arrested and/or
convicted under the old rules.
For a while, the Court dealt with this retroactivity problem in an ad hoc way.
In 1965, the Court announced in Linkletter v. Walker" that the question of who
would obtain relief would be answered by using a case-by-case weighing of the
competing interests. Thus, the Court in Walker held that the Mapp exclusionary
rule would be applied to litigants who were still on direct appeal at the time Mapp
was announced;42 but, one year later, the Court held that the rules announced in
Miranda v. Arizona43 would apply only to defendants whose trial commenced after
Miranda was decided." The Linkletter approach was arbitrary because it often
meant that the lucky litigant (such as Miranda himself) who brought a case to the
Court would reap the benefits of the new rule, while otherwise identically situated
criminal defendants would not. Equally problematic, the case-by-case balancing
approach meant that it was difficult, if not impossible, to predict whether a new
rule of criminal procedure would apply retroactively and, if so, how far
retroactively it would apply: Would the new rule apply to cases on collateral
review? To cases still on direct review? To cases not yet tried?
4 See id. at 14-15 ("First, as we noted in Leon, the exclusionary rule was historically
designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. Second,
respondent offers no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of
exclusion." (citations omitted)). Of course, the Court fourteen years later in Herring extended Evans
to the situation where it was the police themselves who failed to properly keep the records. See
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
41 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
42 Id. at 639-40.
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966).
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The Court finally abandoned the Linkletter regime twenty-two years later in
Griffith v. Kentucky,4 5 and instead announced that new rules of criminal procedure
are applicable to criminal defendants whose direct appeals were still ongoing at the
time the new decision was announced.46 Thus, Griffith stated a clear decisional
rule that state and federal appellate courts must apply: so long as a criminal
defendant had properly preserved a claim for appeal, the defendant would be
entitled to the benefit of a binding appellate decision in his or her favor on that
issue so long as the binding decision came down before his or her conviction was
finalized by the end of the direct appellate process.
D. Davis: An Easy Application of Gant, Leon, and Griffith?
One day in 2007, Willie Davis had some rotten luck in the small town of
Greenville, Alabama. Since Mr. Davis' bad day occurred two years before Gant
came down, his luck got even worse when he went to court.
Mr. Davis' misfortune began when he accepted a ride from one Stella Owens.
Ms. Owens' poor driving resulted in a traffic stop, and a field sobriety test
confirmed that she was intoxicated. She was then handcuffed and placed in the
back seat of a police car.47
The arresting officer then asked Mr. Davis for his name, and Mr. Davis, "after
a pause," gave the name, "Ernest Harris."48 Unfortunately for Mr. Davis, a group
of bystanders had gathered to watch the encounter, and some of them informed the
officer that the man was actually Willie Davis. The officer discovered that other
data that Mr. Davis had given him (such as date of birth) did indeed match that of
Willie Davis, so the officer arrested him for giving a false name to the police. Mr.
Davis then was handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car.49
Having custodially arrested not just one but both of the vehicle's occupants,
the officer proceeded to search the passenger compartment, where he found a gun
in Mr. Davis' jacket.so Mr. Davis was charged in federal court with possession of
a firearm by a felon, and the lower courts denied his motion to suppress the gun
because the clear holding of Belton, as confirmed by binding Eleventh Circuit
45 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
46 The corollary of Griffith is that, with very limited exceptions, a new rule of criminal
procedure cannot form the basis for relief for a defendant whose direct appeal ended before the new
rule was announced. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
47 This rendition of the facts is drawn from United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.
2010). For reasons I cannot fathom, Justice Alito's opinion for the Supreme Court leaves out the
more entertaining facts.
48 Id. at 1261.
49 Id.
5o id.
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precedent,' permitted the officer to search the passenger compartment of Ms.
Owens' car incident to the arrests.
After Mr. Davis' conviction, but while his appeal was still pending in the
Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Gant. Despite Gant, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed Mr. Davis' conviction. The circuit court agreed that the search of
the car that produced Mr. Davis' gun was unconstitutional under Gant because
both Ms. Owens and Mr. Davis were secured in police vehicles at the time of the
search, and the officer did not have reason to believe he would find evidence of
their crimes of arrest in the vehicle.52 But the court held that the gun could not be
excluded because the arresting officer reasonably relied on Belton and Eleventh
Circuit precedent at the time of the search.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision by a 7-2 vote. Accepting that the search that produced the gun violated
Gant, the majority agreed, as do I, that the case presented a very straightforward
application of the Leon principle that the exclusionary rule does not apply when
police officers reasonably rely on legal determinations made by competent
authorities. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how an officer's decision to search could
be more reasonable than when he relies on a Supreme Court decision and
innumerable lower court decisions, including binding lower court decisions, telling
him that he is entitled to search in this precise situation. As Justice Alito put it for
six members of the Court, "It is one thing for the criminal 'to go free because the
constable has blundered.' It is quite another to set the criminal free because the
constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law."5 4
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented primarily on the ground
that the result contravened the Griffith retroactivity principle-after all, they
argued, Gant came down during Mr. Davis' direct appeal, so he should be entitled
to the full benefit of that decision, including the exclusion of the evidence found in
violation of Gant.5 5 Justice Alito responded that the Gant rule did apply to Mr.
Davis' case, but whether he was entitled to a particular remedy as a result of the
s1 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825-26 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding
Belton search where arrestee had been removed from car and secured before officer performed
search).
52 As the Eleventh Circuit explained:
There can be no serious dispute that the search here violated Davis's Fourth Amendment
rights as defined in Gant. First, both he and the car's driver had been handcuffed and
secured in separate police cruisers before Sergeant Miller performed the search. Second,
Davis was arrested for "an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in
the passenger compartment," because Miller had already verified Davis's identity when
he arrested him for giving a false name.
Davis, 598 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009)).
" Id. at 1265-68.
54 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
ss Id. at 2437-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Gant violation is an entirely separate question from the threshold question of
whether he could invoke Gant at all.
The trickiest problem for the majority was to answer Mr. Davis' argument
that the Court would never have occasion to revisit an erroneous Fourth
Amendment decision if criminal defendants could not possibly hope to suppress
the evidence the police seized under that decision. Justice Alito came up with a
number of answers to this problem, some more satisfying than others. Justice
Alito first responded to the dilemma with a metaphorical shrug of the shoulders;
the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, so if
defendants lose the incentive to challenge bad Fourth Amendment decisions, well,
that's just too bad.
But Justice Alito went on to recognize that an erroneous Fourth Amendment
decision from the Supreme Court could be challenged in a civil action against the
municipality (thus avoiding the shield that qualified immunity would give to the
officers who acted under the challenged precedent).58  Or maybe a criminal
defendant could obtain review by arguing that his case was distinguishable from
the challenged precedent and the Court could then use that case as a vehicle to
overrule the precedent." Or perhaps the Court could just grant suppression to the
one lucky criminal defendant who succeeds in convincing the Court to strike down
a Fourth Amendment precedent in order to ensure that defendants continue to have
the incentive to argue that the Court's precedents should be overruled.o
In the end, Justice Alito assured us in perhaps the most telling passage of the
majority opinion that the argument Mr. Davis raised is really not much of a
problem because the Court almost never overrules its own Fourth Amendment
cases to make the law more favorable to defendants: "Indeed, it has been more
56 As Justice Alito cogently explained:
Gant therefore applies retroactively to this case. Davis may invoke its newly announced
rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law as a basis for seeking relief. The question,
then, becomes one of remedy, and on that issue Davis seeks application of the
exclusionary rule. But exclusion of evidence does not automatically follow from the fact
that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
Id. at 2431 (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 2432-33. Justice Alito went on to note that there would be no disincentive to
challenge decisions of lower courts on Fourth Amendment issues and that the Supreme Court would
always eventually get an opportunity to weigh in so long as there was a split of authority so that some
criminal defendants could claim that the officers were not following binding authority. Id at 2433.
This response, of course, does not work when the erroneous decision is a precedent of the Supreme
Court.
" Id. at 2433 n.9.
5 Id. at 2433 (Justice Alito cited Gant as an example of a case in which a criminal defendant
argued that a prior binding precedent, Belton, was distinguishable.).
6 Id. at 2433-34. As Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, rewarding just the one fortunate
litigant who brought the case to the Court is precisely the sort of arbitrariness that led the Court to
adopt the Griffith rule in the first place. Id. at 2437-38.
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than 40 years since the Court last handed down a decision of the type to which
Davis refers."6 1
Having swatted away all of Mr. Davis' arguments, the majority concluded
that this really is an easy case-the officer relied on binding circuit precedent and
the then-universal understanding of Belton in concluding that he could search the
car after arresting Ms. Owen and Mr. Davis. If the exclusionary rule is really only
about deterring the police from violating the Fourth Amendment-and the Leon
line leaves no doubt that such deterrence is the sole extant justification for the
rule-then it would make no sense at all to exclude the evidence here.
And I agree with all of that. In other words, I agree with the result. But while
I do not agree with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg that the evidence here should
have been excluded, I share their concern about the tone of the majority opinion
and what it seems to mean for the future of the exclusionary rule. So I turn to
those issues now.
II. WHAT DOES DA VIS TELL US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE?
Now that I have worked through what Davis was about and what the majority
held, it is time to discuss what the case actually means, that is, what signals the
decision sends as to the likely outcome of future exclusionary rule cases. I will
organize my discussion around four brief observations.
1. A majority of the Court hates the exclusionary rule. This, of
course, is the most obvious observation. Justice Alito's majority
contained the now-obligatory "we can't stand the exclusionary rule"
section. This section rehashed all of the greatest hits from earlier
decisions cutting back on the exclusionary rule, including: (1) the
"substantial social costs" claim; 62 (2) the "we used to blindly apply the
exclusionary rule, but no more" discussion;63 and (3) the rule must "pay
its way" proclamation.6'
It seems that every exclusionary rule decision since Leon has
contained some discussion of how much the Court dislikes the rule, but
Hudson took the disdain to a whole new level. Davis serves to simply
61 Id. at 2433 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), as the last case to overrule
precedents of the Court as insufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights).
62 Id at 2427 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). The "substantial
social costs" discussion invariably makes the obvious point that the rule results in exclusion of
probative evidence and usually means that a criminal will go free. There is never any discussion of
how often this actually happens. Justice Alito's majority opinion in Davis is perhaps notable for
adding "bitter pill" to the list of phrases used to denigrate the exclusionary rule. Id.
63 See id. ("Admittedly, there was a time when our exclusionary-rule cases were not nearly so
discriminating in their approach to the doctrine.").
6 Id. at 2428 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 919).
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remind us that nothing has changed since Hudson: the Court still finds
the exclusionary rule deeply distasteful.
2. The exclusionary rule survives in principle, if not in practice,
because Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hudson actually meant
something. The most important fact about Davis is that we still have a
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule five years after Hudson. Given the
evident hostility to Mapp that permeated Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Hudson, this can only mean one thing: Justice Kennedy is still
not on board for overruling Mapp and abrogating the exclusionary rule.
For the first few years after Hudson, speculation was rife as to
whether the Court would soon overrule Mapp. 5 The decision in Hudson
certainly provided lots of reasons to think that such a direct attack on the
exclusionary rule was coming. Five members of the Court signed an
opinion that denigrated Mapp as an outdated decision based on
assumptions that no longer held water.6 6  But Justice Kennedy both
signed that opinion and issued a concurrence that assured us that, despite
the anti-Mapp language he had joined in the majority opinion, the
continued existence of the exclusionary rule was not in doubt.17
Five years and two major decisions after Hudson, it now clear that
Justice Kennedy meant what he said in his Hudson concurrence and that
he will not vote to overrule Mapp. So the opinion in Davis says lots of
nasty things about the exclusionary rule but, unlike Hudson, does not
repeat any of the language from Hudson arguing that Mapp is outdated
and misguided. The exclusionary rule, or what remains of it, is safe for a
while longer.
3. Herring and Davis illustrate the Court's strategy to destroy
the exclusionary rule without actually overruling Mapp. Since Justice
Kennedy is apparently not going to vote to overrule Mapp, the anti-
exclusionary justices have decided to defang the rule instead by sharply
65 See, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons From the Highway and the
Subway: a Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 788 (2007)
(recognizing that the majority opinion in Hudson clearly "implies that the exclusionary rule's days
are numbered"); Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2005 Supreme Court Term, 22
TOURO L. REv. 873, 879 (2007) (concluding that after Hudson, "the continued existence of the
exclusionary rule [and] the exceptions that will be created, all depend on Justice Kennedy"); Thomas
Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio that Misses the Larger Exclusionary Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 619 (2007) (concluding that exclusionary rule was in doubt after Hudson); Frederick
Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARv. L. REv. 4, 28 n.76 (2006)
(arguing that Hudson "signals growing doubts about the future viability of the exclusionary rule
itself").
66 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) ("We cannot assume that
exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the public today to pay for the
sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost half a century ago.").
67 Id. at 602-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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limiting its reach. The best evidence that this is a concerted strategy is
that the Court has now twice announced a "culpability" limitation on the
application of the exclusionary rule even though the officers' culpability
was not at issue in either case.
As I discussed in the introductory portion of this term paper, Chief
Justice Roberts used his Herring majority opinion in an attempt to
engraft a brand new, officer-culpability requirement onto the
exclusionary rule. Only deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct
by individual officers would require exclusion; mere ordinary negligence
would not.68 Never mind that this discussion was dicta since the line
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence was not at issue in
Herring, and never mind that the opinion made no serious effort to
explain the difference in the context of a typical Fourth Amendment
violation.
Justice Alito went far out of his way in his opinion in Davis to
reinforce the Herring dicta. There was no conceivable argument in
Davis that the police engaged in any negligent conduct of any kind. On
the contrary, as Justice Alito correctly recognized, the arresting officer
followed the widespread understanding of Belton and the binding circuit
precedent to the letter when he searched the car after custodially
arresting Stella Owens and Willie Davis. Therefore, there was absolutely
no occasion in Davis to discuss or apply the Herring dicta distinguishing
between mere negligence and more culpable forms of police misconduct.
But the lack of a reason to discuss the Herring culpability
framework did not stop Justice Alito from doing so anyway. In the key
paragraph of his opinion, he reframed the Herring dicta as if it had
actually flowed directly from the Leon line:
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the
deterrence benefits of exclusion "var[y] with the culpability of
the law enforcement conduct" at issue. Herring, 555 U.S. at
143. When the police exhibit "deliberate," "reckless," or
"grossly negligent" disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the
deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the
resulting costs. Id. at 144. But when the police act with an
objectively "reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is
lawful, Leon, supra, at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted),
or when their conduct involves only simple, "isolated"
negligence, Herring, supra, at 137, the "'deterrence rationale
loses much of its force,"' and exclusion cannot "pay its way."
68 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
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See Leon, supra, at 919, 908, n. 6 (quoting United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).69
Justice Alito thus treated the Herring "isolated negligence vs. gross
negligence" dicta as if it were a well-established part of the Leon line.
He then "applied" that "rule" in the case at hand by noting that "[t]he
officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis' Fourth
Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence."7 0
But, as pointed out above, the officer also did not violate Davis' right
with "isolated" or "ordinary" negligence, either. In other words, the
application of the Herring dicta in Davis is itself pure dicta.
It was left to Justice Breyer in his dissent to point out that the
Herring dicta is, in fact, dicta and that this dicta threatens to eviscerate
the exclusionary rule. As Justice Breyer put it, if the exclusionary rule
would apply only where a "violation was 'deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent,' then the 'good faith' exception will swallow the exclusionary
rule. Indeed, our broad dicta in Herring-dicta the Court repeats and
expands upon today-may already be leading lower courts in this
direction."7
Since neither Herring nor Davis actually required the Court to draw
the line between isolated or ordinary negligence and gross negligence,
the Court has not answered the most obvious question about what the
dicta means: if an officer violates the Fourth Amendment based on an
honest misunderstanding as to what the law permits, is that gross
negligence or ordinary negligence? If an officer's honest
misunderstanding of the law is mere ordinary negligence, it follows
immediately, as Justice Breyer recognized, that the Herring dicta means
that the vast majority of Fourth Amendment violations will not result in
exclusion.72 As Justice Breyer quoted Professor LaFave, "Surely many
more Fourth Amendment violations result from carelessness than from
intentional constitutional violations."7
So the question remains: what, exactly, does the Court mean by
"gross negligence," as opposed to isolated or ordinary negligence? To
take one concrete example, suppose that an officer who was a member of
a team lawfully in a home to perform an arrest found a gun while
performing a protective sweep of the home shortly after the arrestee had
'9 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
70 Id. at 2428 (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
n1 Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 2439 (recognizing that "an officer who conducts a search that he believes
complies with the Constitution but which, it ultimately turns out, falls just outside the Fourth
Amendment's bounds is no more culpable than officer who follows erroneous "binding precedent.").
7 Id. (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.3, 64 (4th ed. 2004)).
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been taken out of the home. That search was unlawful because a
protective sweep may only be conducted while the arrestee is still on the
premises.74 But suppose the officer honestly believed he could perform a
protective sweep after the arrest was completed so long as the sweep was
substantially contemporaneous to the arrest. I would be hard-pressed to
call the officer "grossly negligent" for misunderstanding the law given
that my highly-educated criminal procedure students often make the
same mistake when faced with such a problem on an exam.
One more example has to be mentioned, this one arising from the
GantlBelton line itself. Suppose an officer who graduated from police
academy in 2008, where she was taught and trained in Belton searches,
performed a vehicle search incident to arrest in 2010 after arresting the
driver for drunk driving and securing him in the back of her squad car.
Was the officer "grossly negligent" in 2010 for not realizing that Gant in
2009 had rejected the broad reading of Belton under which she had been
trained?
Since the discussion of officer culpability in Herring and Davis was
dicta, we do not really know what "gross negligence" means. But if the
term is to have the meaning usually ascribed to it, a deviation from the
standard of care so great that society is justified in imposing criminal
sanctions for the breach, it would be hard to imagine how an officer
could be called "grossly negligent" for an honest misunderstanding as to
what kinds of searches and seizures the Fourth Amendment permits.
If the Court means, as Justice Breyer and I suspect it means, a run-
of-the-mine mistake by an officer who has failed to grasp the fine points
of Fourth Amendment doctrine is not "grossly negligent," the
exclusionary rule game is really over. In that case, it just does not matter
whether Mapp is formally overruled or not. Such a holding would
eliminate any incentive for police forces to intensively train their officers
on the fine points of search and seizure law, and it would reward officers
who err on the side of searching and seizing. Such a holding would, in
one stroke, remove most of the remaining protections the Fourth
Amendment provides against overzealous police conduct.
Unfortunately, I think that is exactly what the Court means to do.
Having failed to persuade Justice Kennedy to go along with a complete
overruling of Mapp, the other members of the Hudson majority have
adopted a strategy of stating a rule of minimizing the exclusionary rule
by excluding the vast majority of violations from its reach. The Court
stated that rule in Herring and strongly restated it in Davis.
74 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1990) ("The sweep lasts no longer than is
necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to
complete the arrest and depart the premises.").
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Dicta twice stated starts to look a lot like a holding. And when the
next case comes around in which the officer got the law wrong but was
not "grossly negligent" in her misunderstanding, the majority will be in
position to say that this is exactly the sort of case that the Herring "rule"
was intended to remove from the operation of the exclusionary rule. And
then the exclusionary rule will just be a vestigial doctrine that can be
trotted out on those very rare occasions when an officer behaves so
brazenly that his or her conduct can only be characterized as "grossly
negligent" or worse.
4. The newest justices are not much help. As a final observation,
it is worth mentioning that the two justices who were not on the Court
when Hudson and Herring were decided do not affect the above analysis.
First, of course, there is simple math. Hudson and Herring were decided
by five votes to four, and all five members of the majority in those cases
are still on the Court. Since Justice Kennedy is apparently willing to go
along with an evisceration of the exclusionary rule so long as Mapp is
not actually overruled, the fact that two members of the Hudson and
Herring dissents have been replaced does not really matter.
Justice Sotomayor wrote a brief opinion concurring in the judgment
in Davis. She agreed with the majority, as do I, that exclusion is
inappropriate when an officer followed binding precedent subsequently
overruled. But she wrote separately to stress that exclusion is
appropriate when an officer acts in the face of unsettled Fourth
Amendment law because otherwise officers "would have little incentive
to err on the side of constitutional behavior."76 Justice Sotomayor then
clearly signaled that she will not go along with a decision based on the
Herring culpability dicta: "We have never refused to apply the
exclusionary rule where its application would appreciably deter Fourth
Amendment violations on the mere ground that the officer's conduct
could be characterized as nonculpable.""
Justice Kagan, on the other hand, joined Justice Alito's majority
opinion. Perhaps Justice Kagan, who does not have a background in
criminal law, has not thought through what the Herring dicta would
mean to the exclusionary rule and will part company with the Hudson
and Herring majority when a case testing whether "gross negligence" is
truly required for exclusion comes to the Court. Or perhaps Justice
Kagan is no fan of the exclusionary rule. I have no idea which theory is
correct, but I certainly wish she had not joined the majority decision.
75 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment).
76 Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982)).
77 id.
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CONCLUSION
To use a trite metaphor, the exclusionary rule is on life support. Davis
confirms that the Court will not overrule Mapp anytime soon, but it also confirms
that a solid majority of the justices have devised a strategy that eliminates any need
to formally abolish the exclusionary rule.
It seems inevitable that the Court will soon take a case squarely presenting the
issue that the Herring dicta has created: if an officer performs an unconstitutional
search and seizure based on a simple misunderstanding of what the law permits,
should the resulting evidence be excluded? I fear that five members of the Court
are prepared to answer that question "yes."
